Deception before
Truth: A Washington SOP
As a novice Time foreign correspondent in 1984, I was
stunned to learn how breezily Washington officials would lie and distort
facts. I had been a newspaper reporter
for almost ten years, and I knew local government officials and police
sometimes answered questions evasively or withheld information they deemed
inconvenient. However, I regarded federal elected or appointed officials as
ethically bound not to lie or fabricate false information.
I was touchingly naïve.
My first reporting trips to El Salvador in early 1984
underscored my naivete. Salvadorans had
for years been victims of gruesome murders and disappearances. Between 8.000 to
10,000 people per year throughout the 1980s were murdered. Mutiliated corpses and unofficial sources
pointed to horrific tortures preceding murders.
Who were the murderous fiends? Salvadorans typically would
not talk about the subject, but some discreetly suggested the government was responsible.
United States Embassy officials blamed shadowy
anti-communist vigilantes. Some said the killings were Tic-Tack homicides,
named after a popular aguardiente. Drunken men killed each other, and that
explained the mutilated corpses.
How was it possible, I asked American political officers,
how the murders and disappearances could go unchecked in a heavily militarized
small nation? They professed to be puzzled.
I did a bit of digging and uncovered most of the truth. The Salvadoran
army and other security forces comprised the death squads. In several interviews
with former squad members, I learned that informers called “ears” provided
information on alleged rebel supporters and activists. The government criminals
called their operations “homework.”
Moreover, in the
early to mid‑1980s, internal U.S. intelligence and embassy cables
repeatedly linked specific Salvadoran units and officers to death‑squad
operations, leading U.S. envoys to warn the high command that continued
killings could jeopardize military aid.
Nonetheless, U.S. military advisers and CIA officers provided
Salvadoran forces with intelligence and interrogation guidance.
A new team of
fabricators in the Trump government is continuing the SOP of lying, but more shamelessly than ever.
The Trump regime’s amateurish and unlawful attempts to
provoke a military conflict with Venezuela brought to mind Operation Just Cause,
another cause based on lies.
Historical amnesia may have erased knowledge of this
significant American military attack on Panama.
In some ways, Operation Just Cause fit Washington’s long
history of unabashed military incursions in the Americas. However, this one, just 36 years ago, had a
unique twist. It also shares
similarities with Trump’s saber-rattling, legally questionable armed attacks in
international waters.
While the Trump administration asserts that the strikes on
suspected drug boats are legally justified under a redefined “armed conflict”
framework, the operations appear to violate key principles of international
law, human rights, and the U.S. Constitution.
The use of lethal military force without evidence, due
process, or transparency sets a dangerous precedent and risks escalating
tensions with Venezuela and undermining global legal norms.
Panama’s Manuel Noriega and the Bush Administration were on
a collision course in 1989. I was a
Washington-based correspondent for Time and reported extensively on the
dispute. Noriega went on the CIA payroll in 1971 when he became the
intelligence chief for Panama’s military, known as the PDF. But Manuel got
involved in other matters, such as collaborating with drug traffickers and selling
information to the Cubans and Sandinistas.
The CIA could and did overlook the drug mischief, but the
full range of his clandestine activities began to be revealed.
Also, Bush was taking heat for his association with Noriega,
who had effectively become the dictator of Panama. It was decided at the highest levels of the
American government that the former U.S. ally had to be removed from his job
and country.
The notorious and glorified Operation Just Cause began on
December 20, 1989, at 1 am with an assault on the Punta Paitilla civilian
airport and several PDF targets. The Río Hata airfield was hit, evidently
because Noriega had a home there.
Here is an excerpt from my book
Since January 1986, I had been a correspondent in Time’s
Washington bureau. My beat was the State Department. In my new position, I
cultivated dozens of sources, including senior officials from the State
Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration. Others were Congressional
staffers who dealt with foreign policy issues. One was Michael Kozak, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, a veteran diplomat
with wide-ranging experience, including assisting in the Panama Canal treaty negotiations.
I encountered Kozak one afternoon in early March 1988.
Diplomats, such as Kozak, who were aware of my on-the-ground experience in
Central America and Panama, were more easily accessible to me than, say, staff
members in the Bureau of European Affairs. I told him he appeared haggard,
hoping he would open up. My gambit worked. Kozak sighed, smiled, and shook his
head. He invited me into his office and said he would reveal something to me,
but that I would have to treat it as background information, not attributed to
him by name, but only as “an administration official.” These were standard
ground rules for officials who wanted information made public.
Kozak told me he had just returned from Panama, where he
met with Noriega to discuss his resignation. I wasn’t entirely surprised,
because there were signs that the administration was searching for ways to have
Noriega removed. Noriega appeared open to stepping down, Kozak said, but no
agreement had been reached.
At the end of our brief interview, I asked Kozak if he
would keep me informed about how his future meetings with Noriega went. He
agreed, and Kozak kept me generally informed during our periodic meetings. In
one interview, he said that the Bush Administration was offering Noriega safe
exile in Spain and the quashing of all criminal drug charges he faced in the
United States.
The dictator had amassed an estimated fortune of $300
million, the proceeds from his criminal activities. I asked if the dictator
would be allowed to keep some of this money. Kozak said he could not answer
that question. However, as a logical matter, he would have to be allowed to
retain a portion of the money to support his life in exile. Noriega’s
handpicked president, Manuel Solís Palma, would remain in office but call new
elections.
Then, in late March 1988, Secretary of State George P.
Shultz went public with a deal offering Noriega safe passage to exile in Spain.
But by May, Noriega was still active in Panama. On May 7, presidential
elections were held, pitting longtime Noriega critic Guillermo Endara against
Carlos Duque, whom the PDF backed. When it became apparent that Endara and his
running mate, Guillermo Ford, had won, the Noriega-controlled electoral board
invalidated the election.
Board officials
cited interference from unnamed outside forces as the reason for their
decision. Foreign election observers, including former President Jimmy Carter,
had concluded that the election was stolen. A May 9, 1989, The New York Times
story said in part, “… an independent sampling of the vote showed that the
opposition coalition, led by Guillermo Endara, had won by a 3-to-1 margin.”
Raucous street protests followed. Demonstrators were set
upon by pro-Noriega Dignity Battalions, some of whom beat Endara and Ford with
clubs and iron bars. Photos of the bloodied men were published worldwide and
made the cover of Time magazine.
In the ensuing chaos, the National Council of State
announced a provisional government in August, headed by a former attorney
general. He promised to organize new elections in six months.
Increasingly, Noriega was turning to Cuban advisers and
counterintelligence agents to hold onto power. Clinton Adlum, posted to Cuba’s
Interest Section in Washington, frequently sought me out. I had for some time
known he was an intelligence agent, and we traded information.
He stressed that despite Noriega’s deep flaws, he and the
PDF were valued allies. I surmised that Panama was an excellent source of
American goods that were denied to Cuba under the terms of the US embargo.
Adlum would not explain the details of the relationship, but State Department
officials told me that Noriega and his Cuban friends were sharing intelligence
on American activities in the region.
Many months later, I learned that Cuban
counterintelligence officials in the days before the US invasion of Panama had
intercepted telephone conversations of American soldiers based in Panama, who
talked of something big in the works.
The Cubans
accurately concluded that an invasion was imminent and warned the Panama
Defense Forces.
Noriega had ruled ruthlessly but from the shadows. Now he
was given to public displays of defiance and fierce denunciations of American
intervention. During one demonstration, he brandished a machete.
In early April 1989, I met with Kozak one last time,
following yet another meeting with Noriega. Kozak was pessimistic that an
agreement would be reached. “He (Noriega) tells me he is a prisoner,” said
Kozak. Quoting Noriega, he said, “‘Look, the men who are close to me won’t let
me leave. They demand that I stay right where I am.’”
Reportedly, Kozak
gave Noriega a May 25th deadline to accept a deal for exile in Spain. The
deadline passed, and the die was cast.
With nearly 28,000 troops, including the 82nd Airborne,
and more than 300 aircraft involved, it was at that time the largest American
deployment since the Vietnam War. The 16,000 PDF and perhaps 2,000 Dignity
Battalion members could at best offer token resistance. I later learned during a
reporting trip to Panama that many soldiers shed their uniforms and hid.
President Bush, in a televised address to the nation, had
in part this to say: “General Noriega’s reckless threats and attacks upon
Americans in Panama created an imminent danger to the 35,000 American citizens
in Panama. As President, I have no higher obligation than to safeguard the
lives of American citizens. And that is why I directed our Armed Forces to
protect the lives of American citizens in Panama and to bring General Noriega
to justice in the United States.” Bush also said the invasion was in response
to Panama’s drug trafficking and money laundering.
Contrary to most historical accounts, the Bush
Administration had long planned an invasion. The shooting of the American
soldier was a pretext. The United States Army website states that meticulous
military training for Just Cause began in May 1989, a full seven months before
the invasion. By all accounts, the assault was overwhelming and terrifying for
many Panamanians.
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